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1 Introduction
From an antitrust perspective, the two central tasks for a theory of price-fixing are identi-
fying conditions that facilitate collusion and, towards discerning the presence of a cartel,
characterizing the properties of collusive pricing. Though there is a large theoretical lit-
erature addressing these issues, work has generally failed to take account of an important
dimension to this problem. In light of the illegality of collusion, firms don’t just want
to achieve prices that raise profit and are internally stable; they also want to avoid cre-
ating suspicions that a cartel has formed. Given that if such suspicions emerge they
could initiate a process that ultimately means the collapse of the cartel and the levying
of substantial financial penalties, avoiding detection is as crucial as deterring deviations
by cartel members.
Towards developing a richer model of cartel pricing, this paper constructs a dynamic
computational model of cartel pricing which endogenizes detection. Recognizing that the
antitrust authorities do not generally detect collusion, the focus is on buyers which, in
many if not most price-fixing cases, are industrial buyers such as with the vitamins, lysine,
and graphite electrodes cartels. In deciding whether or not to form a cartel and, if they do,
what prices to set, the cartel takes into account how their prices influence the likelihood
of triggering detection of collusion by buyers. A modelling challenge arises in that it is
highly problematic to presume that buyers are consciously engaging in detection or that
they know what to look for as regards collusion. What strikes us as the most plausible
specification is that buyers become suspicious when they observe anomalous pricing; that
is, a price path that is unusual or inexplicable. We pursue this idea and develop a novel
theory of belief formation. Buyers are more likely to be suspicious when the likelihood
attached to recent prices is sufficiently small where this likelihood is based on buyers’
beliefs about price changes based on the empirical history of prices. The cartel’s problem
is then set up as a dynamic programming problem with an endogenous terminal date
determined by the buyer’s belief formation process. Associated with this terminal date is
a payoff based on the future profit stream after being caught colluding less any penalties
where these penalties depend on the prices and costs over the time of the cartel.
Several systematic properties emerge. The cartel price path is comprised of a transition
phase - in which price moves largely irrespective of cost - and a stationary phase - in which
price is responsive to cost. In the transition phase, price initially rises though, for some
parameter specifications, the price path overshoots so that it converges from above. While
price is sensitive to cost in the stationary phase, it is much less volatile than either the
2
non-collusive price or the simple monopoly price path. Furthermore, collusion results in
cost shocks taking a longer time to pass-through to price. In industries with less cost
variability, the transition phase tends to be longer, price doesn’t rise as fast, and there is
more overshooting. Though the analysis is clearly intended to be exploratory, the ensuing
price paths are encouraging in that they look much more like actual cartel price paths
than what has thus far been produced by the theory of collusive pricing.1
RelatedWork Previous work has explored optimal cartel pricing under the constraint
of possible detection though using static formulations or restricted dynamic models. There
are three classes of models. First are static models which use a reduced form approach to
modelling detection or prosecution. The earliest paper is Block, Nold, and Sidak (1981)
which assumes the probability of detection is increasing in the price-cost margin. A second
class continues with an exogenous modelling of detection but considers a dynamic setting.
Cyrenne (1999) modifies Green and Porter (1984) by assuming that a price war, and
the ensuing raising of price after the war, results in detection for sure. Spagnolo (2000)
and Motta and Polo (2003) explore the effects of leniency programs on the incentives to
collude when the probability of detection and penalties are both fixed. Though considering
collusive behavior in a dynamic setting with antitrust laws, these papers exclude the
sources of dynamics that are the foci of the current analysis; specifically, they do not
allow detection and penalties to be sensitive to firms’ current and past pricing behavior.
More closely related is recent work by one of the authors (Harrington, 2003, 2004a, 2005).
In those papers, a dynamic theory of cartel pricing is developed in which price influences
the likelihood of detection but, contrary to the current paper, a reduced form approach is
used to model how prices influence detection. For example, the probability of detection is
assumed to be increasing in the extent of price changes or in the price level. In the current
paper, there is an explicit model of buyers’ beliefs which has the virtue of generating a
richer set of dynamics and being able to endogenously derive how the properties of the
price path depend on industry traits such as cost variability. The third class of models are
static but endogenize detection by modelling those who are engaging in it. The original
work was Besanko and Spulber (1989, 1990) who use a game of incomplete information
so that buyers or the antitrust authority are uncertain about some relevant parameter
which makes them uncertain about whether a cartel has formed. Further work using
this approach includes LaCasse (1995), Souam (2001), and Schinkel and Tuinstra (2002).
In comparison, our model has multiple periods - and thus can derive results on pricing
1For some actual cartel price paths, see Levenstein and Suslow (2001).
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dynamics - and it endogenizes detection using non-equilibrium beliefs for buyers which
we believe is more plausible.
2 Model
2.1 Market Conditions
Consider a symmetric oligopoly with a linear market demand function:
D (P ) = a− bP,
where a, b > 0. Firms have a common constant marginal cost of production. While
the demand function is assumed to be fixed over time, marginal cost is allowed to vary
stochastically. Letting ct be unit cost in t, industry profit is
π
¡
P, ct
¢
≡
¡
P − ct
¢
(a− bP ) .
As our analysis will focus on characterizing the joint profit maximizing price, industry
profit is all that matters. As we’ll see, the analysis is quite rich even without taking
account of incentive compatibility constraints which we plan to tackle in the next step of
this research.
Subject to some boundary conditions, ct = ct−1+εt with εt being normally distributed
and iid over time. For future reference, let f
¡
·;µ, σ2
¢
denote the density function for the
normal distribution with mean and variance
¡
µ, σ2
¢
; the density function on εt is then
f
¡
·;µε, σ2ε
¢
. Unit cost has support [c, c] and assume 0 ≤ c < c < a with the last inequality
ensuring that, for all cost realizations, there exists a common price such that firm profit
is positive. The stochastic process on cost is then
ct =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
c if ct−1 + εt < c
ct−1 + εt if c ≤ ct−1 + εt ≤ c
c if c < ct−1 + εt
or, equivalently,
ct = υ
¡
ct−1 + εt
¢
≡ max
©
c,min
©
ct−1 + εt, c
ªª
.
Firms commonly observe the current period’s cost prior to choosing price. For future
reference, the joint profit-maximizing price is
Pm
¡
ct
¢
≡ a+ bc
t
2b
.
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In the absence of forming a cartel, firms achieve a non-collusive solution which is
characterized by a common price bP (ct) with industry profit of
bπ ¡ct¢ ≡ ³ bP ¡ct¢− ct´³a− b bP ¡ct¢´ .
Given linear demand and cost functions, the analysis will focus on linear non-collusive
(equilibrium) pricing rules, bP ¡ct¢ = w0 + w1ct,
where (w0, w1) ∈ [0, a/2b)× (1/2, 1] . This class of solutions includes the Nash equilibrium
to the price game with homogeneous goods, (w0, w1) = (0, 1) , and the Nash equilibrium
to the quantity game with homogeneous goods, (w0, w1) = (a/b (n+ 1) , n/ (n+ 1)) , as
well as the Nash equilibrium to the price game for some formulations of symmetrically
differentiated products.
With an infinite horizon, each firm’s payoff is the discounted sum of expected profits
where the common discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1) .When firms are not colluding, the expected
present value of the industry’s profit stream at t (after the period’s cost is realized) is
denoted W (ct) and is defined recursively by:
W
¡
ct
¢
= bπ ¡ct¢+ δ Z W ¡υ ¡ct + ε¢¢ f ¡ε;µε, σ2ε¢ dε.
2.2 Cartel Detection
If firms form a cartel, it is detected with some probability and firms incur penalties in that
event. In practice, detection occurs from a variety of sources; some of which are related
to price - such as customer complaints - and some of which are unrelated to price - such
as internal whistleblowers. Hay and Kelley (1974) find that detection was attributed to a
complaint by a customer or a local, state, or federal agency in 13 of 49 price-fixing cases
and, more recently, cases were initiated in graphite electrodes (Levenstein and Suslow,
2001) and stainless steel (Levenstein, Suslow, and Oswald, 2004) by buyers’ complaints.
Anomalous pricing may cause customers to become suspicious and pursue legal action or
share their suspicions with the antitrust authorities.2 But, as a matter of practice, the
antitrust authorities do not engage in detection:
As a general rule, the [Antitrust] Division follows leads generated by disgrun-
tled employees, unhappy customers, or witnesses from ongoing investigations.
2The Nasdaq case is one in which truly anomalous pricing resulted in suspicions about collusion. It
was scholars rather than market participants who observed that dealers avoided odd-eighth quotes and
ultimately explained it as a form of collusive behavior (Christie and Schultz, 1994).
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As such, it is very much a reactive agency with respect to the search for crim-
inal antitrust violations. ... Customers, especially federal, state, and local
procurement agencies, play a role in identifying suspicious pricing, bid, or
shipment patterns. [McAnney, 1991, pp. 529, 530]
In practice, it is buyers - and, in most cartel cases, they are industrial buyers - who
are part of the first line of detection.
In previous work on this topic by one of the authors (Harrington, 2003, 2004a, 2005),
a reduced from approach was taken to modelling detection. Various specifications were
considered including having the probability of detection be increasing in the price level
and the absolute value of the change in price. In this paper, we take on the more difficult
task of endogenizing detection by explicitly modelling buyers’ beliefs and how they come
to suspect that a cartel is present. To be clear, we are trying to model what leads buyers
to think that firms may have cartelized. There are thousands of industries, yet cartels
are suspected in only a few. Our goal is to model how firm behavior triggers suspicions
among buyers. The implicit assumption is that once suspicions emerge, an investigation
reveals evidence of collusion if indeed there is a cartel. Admittedly, this is only the start
of the process in that suspicions will typically be followed with a preliminary investigation
- by the potential plaintiffs or the antitrust authorities - to determine whether the case is
worth pursuing. And, if it is, there is still the process by which conviction or a settlement
is achieved. For the sake of parsimony, we focus on modelling the first stage - the creation
of suspicions about collusion - and presume that an investigation will reveal the truth.3
The classical game-theoretic equilibrium approach to endogenizing buyers’ beliefs
about a cartel having formed is to model it as a game of incomplete information where
buyers do not know some firm trait relevant to cartel formation; for example, a common
cost which is privately known to the firms. A Bayes-Nash equilibrium is characterized for
a setting in which buyers observe price and then Bayesian update over the two possible
events - a cartel has formed and a cartel has not formed - using their prior beliefs over the
unknown firm trait and their knowledge of the collusive and non-collusive pricing func-
3Though detection leads to conviction for sure, results would almost certainly go through if the prob-
ability of conviction is only required to be positive. The more restrictive aspect of this specification is
that the probability of firms paying penalties, conditional on an investigation, is independent of prices.
However, this is probably not a bad assumption. Though a cartel may be detected because of suspicious
pricing, price data is typically not central to achieving a conviction or a guilty plea; rather, it is "smok-
ing gun" evidence such as memos, meetings, and witnesses that are of primary importance. Prices are,
however, important in determining penalties and this our model allows for.
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tions. This approach is used in Besanko and Spulber (1989, 1990) for the static setting.
What makes this approach problematic, in our opinion, is that it rests on the assumption
that buyers know how a cartel prices. It is the objective of this research project to char-
acterize how a cartel prices and to presume that buyers (or even the antitrust authorities)
already know the answer is simply denying reality. To begin, figuring out how a cartel
prices meaning solving a hard problem - how cartels price over time when they want
to avoid detection in the midst of endogenous penalties. It is a problem for which the
experts - academic economists and consultants - do not currently have an answer. Yet,
taking the vitamins case as an example, an equilibrium approach requires us to suppose
that a mid-level employee of Tyson Foods is going to have the sophistication to address a
question that a PhD Economist might not be able to solve. At this point, we often resort
to the argument that an economic agent doesn’t need to solve for another agent’s strategy
but can learn it from experience. But if this is the typical industry then there is no docu-
mented history of collusion among input suppliers and thereby no experience from which
the employee can draw. Furthermore, even if employees had the tools and data to address
this difficult question, we contend it would not be optimal for them to do so. They have
limited time and resources and using them to develop a strategy for detecting collusion,
given its empirical frequency in the economy is low (as measured by detected cartels),
would not pass a cost-benefit analysis. Their time would be better spent scoping out new
suppliers, managing inventories, working out new contractual arrangements, controlling
waste, and the like rather than focusing on the unlikely outcome of there being collusion
among input suppliers.
For these various reasons, we have chosen not to assume buyers know the collusive
pricing function, nor that they consciously engage in detection. This does not imply,
however, that detection is exogenous, nor that buyers are oblivious to the possibility
of collusion. Our working assumption is that when something strange happens - like a
sudden price increase or an unusual pattern in price changes - the possibility of collusion
enters into the mind of buyers. The observation of an "unlikely" price series may trigger
buyers to reevaluate their implicit model of how prices are determined and thereby put
into question their maintained hypothesis of competition. This could result in a variety
of alternative hypotheses with collusion being one of them. In the remainder of this sub-
section, we put forth a theoretical model of buyers’ beliefs and follow it with a description
of how we implement it computationally.
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2.2.1 Modelling Anomalous Events - Theoretical Specification
The task before us is to model what it means for buyers to observe an anomalous event.
It is such events that provide the epiphany to re-evaluate one’s presumptions about how
price is determined and which allow the possibility of collusion to move to the forefront
of a buyer’s mind. The spirit of the approach we take is based on the idea of hypothesis
testing.4 Buyers have a null hypothesis about the pricing process and become "suspicious"
when the observed price series is sufficiently unlikely under the null. Thus, one can think
of the discrete event of "becoming suspicious" as being associated with rejecting the null
hypothesis. More specifically, buyers’ null beliefs are based on price data when firms had
been competing. Then, unbeknownst to the buyers, the firms have cartelized. The issue
is whether buyers will pick up the structural break.
Given the true underlying stochastic process on firms’ common unit cost and that the
non-collusive price is an affine function of cost, it is natural to presume that buyers believe
the price-generating process to be:
P t = P t−1 + ζt,
where ζt is normally distributed. However, they do not know the mean and variance of the
distribution on price changes. One motivation for this specification is that buyers have the
maintained hypotheses that price is an affine function of cost and cost changes are normally
distributed but do not know the coefficients to the pricing function or the moments of the
cost distribution.5 To derive moments to their beliefs, buyers use observed prices. Buyers
have a memory of k periods so that, coming into period t, their data set is comprised of
the k most recent price changes,
©
∆P t−k, . . . ,∆P t−1
ª
, where ∆P τ ≡ P τ − P τ−1. The
ith moment of the sampling distribution coming into t is
mt−1i ≡
µ
1
k
¶ t−1X
τ=t−k
(∆P τ )i .
Buyers’ beliefs over the period t price change are assumed to have a normal distribution
based on the sampling moments, N
³
mt−11 ,m
t−1
2 −
¡
mt−11
¢2´
.
Now consider buyers "testing" a sequence of the z < k most recent observations, as
of the end of t. The idea is not that they test all these price changes at once but are, in
4For the use of hypothesis testing in learning in games, see Foster and Young (2003).
5One might object at this point that there is an inconsistency in this formulation in that buyers
presume the stochastic price process is fixed when, in fact, it can change because of cartel formation.
But then that is really the heart of the problem. Will buyers pick up the "break" in the price process
associated with cartelization?
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a sense, testing each price change as it occurs. Recall that buyers are not assumed to be
consciously engaging in this process. The likelihood of the z most recent price changes is
specified to be
lt ≡ Πtτ=t+1−zf
³
∆P τ ;mτ−11 ,m
τ−1
2 −
¡
mτ−11
¢2´
.
This is a moving likelihood in that the density function is updated along the way. It is as
if buyers remember how surprised they were in the past. Allowing z ≥ 2 can capture the
compound unlikeliness of having consecutive periods of price increases when such price
increases are atypical.6 The maximum likelihood is the highest likelihood one could assign
to price changes over the preceding z periods given what buyers knew at the time the
price change occurred. Letting mlt denote the maximum likelihood then
mlt ≡ Πtτ=t+1−zmax
yτ
f
³
yτ ;mτ−11 ,m
τ−1
2 −
¡
mτ−11
¢2´
= Πtτ=t+1−zf
³
mτ−11 ;m
τ−1
1 ,m
τ−1
2 −
¡
mτ−11
¢2´
,
where the second equality follows by f having its mode equal to the first moment. Sus-
picions depend on realized likelihood relative to maximum likelihood: Lt ≡ lt/mlt. The
probability of detection is assumed to be a decreasing function of the relative likelihood
and, more specifically, takes the form:
φ
¡
Lt
¢
≡ α0 + α1
¡
1− Lt
¢α2 ,
where α0 ≥ 0 and α1, α2 > 0. In that α0 is independent of prices, it captures sources
of detection unrelated to price such as an internal whistleblower or incidental discovery
through an unrelated legal case.
A key assumption of the model is that φ (Lt) is the probability firms assign to "be-
ing caught" which means paying penalties and discontinuing collusion. What we really
imagine is that φ (Lt) is the probability of suspicions emerging which is seen as a discrete
event - buyers have an epiphany that firms may not be competing. Of course, suspicions
do not immediately translate into conviction. Buyers must decide to inform the author-
ities and/or bring a private case themselves, and if there is public or private case then
firms must either plead guilty or be convicted in order for penalties to be levied. This
is a rich process which we have summarized in a single probability, φ (Lt) , for reasons of
6Though it needs to be emphasized that buyers are not engaging in pattern recognition. If buyers’
beliefs over price changes have a zero first moment - and thereby are symmetric around zero - then a
series of price changes - all with the same absolute value - will have the same likelihood. This means, for
example, that three consecutive price increases of size ε > 0 is just as likely as price changes of ε, −ε, and
ε.
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tractability. We hope that future work will open up that black box and enrich this class
of models further.
2.2.2 Modelling Anomalous Events - Computational Specification
There are several changes that need to be made to numerically implement this model.
One immediate problem is that the buyers have at least k state variables. In that we are
going to use dynamic programming to solve the cartel’s problem and buyers’ beliefs are
part of it, the dimensionality of the state space can be a serious obstacle to numerical
analysis. Rather than limit k, we pursue an approach approximating what was described
above.
Consider the following manipulation of the moments:
mti =
µ
1
k
¶ tX
τ=t−k+1
(∆P τ )i
=
µ
1
k
¶ t−1X
τ=t−k
(∆P τ )
i
+
µ
1
k
¶h¡
∆P t
¢i − ¡∆P t−k¢ii
= mt−1i +
µ
1
k
¶h¡
∆P t
¢i − ¡∆P t−k¢ii .
Thus, in updating moment i in response to the observed price change at t, a weight of 1/k
is transferred from the t − kth observation to the tth observation. Now consider instead
transferring weight from all past observations - not just the t − kth observation - and
assigning it to the new observation,
mti =
µ
k − 1
k
¶
mt−1i +
µ
1
k
¶¡
∆P t
¢i
.
Generalizing this equation of motion, we have
mti = λim
t−1
i + (1− λi)
¡
∆P t
¢i
.
With this specification, the two state variables (mt1,m
t
2) help take the place of the data
set of k past price changes. Note that we can capture a "bigger" data set (that is, a higher
value for k) by setting a higher value for λi.
An analogous procedure can be done with the likelihood function. First, perform the
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following steps:
lt = Πtτ=t+1−zf
³
∆P τ ;mτ−11 ,m
τ−1
2 −
¡
mτ−11
¢2´
= Πt−1τ=t−zf
³
∆P τ ;mτ−11 ,m
τ−1
2 −
¡
mτ−11
¢2´⎛⎝ f
³
∆P t;mt−11 ,m
t−1
2 −
¡
mt−11
¢2´
f
³
∆P t−z;mt−z−11 ,m
t−z−1
2 −
¡
mt−z−11
¢2´
⎞⎠
= lt−1
⎛⎝ f
³
∆P t;mt−11 ,m
t−1
2 −
¡
mt−11
¢2´
f
³
∆P t−z;mt−z−11 ,m
t−z−1
2 −
¡
mt−z−11
¢2´
⎞⎠
=
⎡⎣ lt−1
f
³
∆P t−z;mt−z−11 ,m
t−z−1
2 −
¡
mt−z−11
¢2´
⎤⎦ f ³∆P t;mt−11 ,mt−12 − ¡mt−11 ¢2´ .
The approximation entails replacing
f
³
∆P t−z;mt−z−11 ,m
t−z−1
2 −
¡
mt−z−11
¢2´
with the geometric average density for the previous z periods which is
¡
lt−1
¢1/z
. The
approximation is then
lt =
"
lt−1
(lt−1)1/z
#
f
³
∆P t;mt−11 ,m
t−1
2 −
¡
mt−11
¢2´
=
¡
lt−1
¢(z−1)/z
f
³
∆P t;mt−11 ,m
t−1
2 −
¡
mt−11
¢2´
.
Similarly, one can go through these steps for the maximum likelihood to derive the equa-
tion of motion for the relative likelihood:
Lt =
¡
Lt−1
¢ξ ⎡⎣ f
³
∆P t;mt−11 ,m
t−1
2 −
¡
mt−11
¢2´
maxy f
³
y;mt−11 ,m
t−1
2 −
¡
mt−11
¢2´
⎤⎦
where ξ ∈ (0, 1) . A higher value for ξ corresponds with buyers using more price changes
in their "test." The state variables defining buyers’ beliefs are then reduced from the k
most recent price changes to (mt1,m
t
2, L
t) .
Two additional simplifications are made. First, for numerical purposes, the set of price
changes, denoted Φ, is assumed to be finite. Taking account of this property, buyers’ beliefs
over price changes are a discrete analogue to the normal distribution. So, f
¡
·;µ, σ2
¢
is
replaced with h
¡
·;µ, σ2
¢
where:
h
¡
η0;µ, σ2
¢
≡
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
f(η0;µ,σ2)P
η∈Φ f(η;µ,σ
2) if η
0 ∈ Φ
0 otherwise
.
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In that the formulation rests on whether the buyers will pick up the break in the pricing
function as it goes from competition to collusion, buyers will enter the collusive regime
with beliefs based on non-collusive pricing data. Recognizing this fact and in order to
reduce the number of state variables, we will delete the state variable mt2 by assuming
the variance of buyers’ beliefs over price changes is fixed at the variance of price changes
for the non-collusive case, w21σ
2
ε. This is a good approximation for what buyers would
have entering the cartel formation phase. What this rules out is allowing the variance
of price changes to adjust in response to firms’ prices. If such a response was allowed
then the sensitivity of the relative likelihood to the price series could evolve over time.
We consider this a second-order effect. More important is, given a particular relative
likelihood function, how the cartel can influence the likelihood that buyers assign to the
observed price series.
2.3 Cartel’s Problem
Suppose firms decide in period 1 to form a cartel. We can think of detection as the end
of the horizon with a terminal payoff of W (ct)−Xt−F where Xt is the cartel’s damages
in the event it is detected and F is any (fixed) fines. Though it is assumed that, once
caught, firms do not collude thereafter, we conjecture results are robust to allowing them
to restart collusion after some specified number of periods. The cartel’s damages are
assumed to evolve in the following manner:
Xt = βXt−1 + γx
¡
P t, ct
¢
where β ∈ [0, 1) , γ ≥ 0,
where P t is the cartel price at t. As time progresses, damages incurred in previous periods
become increasingly difficult to document and 1 − β measures the rate of deterioration.
x (P t, ct) is the level of damages incurred in the current period where γ is the multiple
of damages that a firm can expect to pay if found caught colluding. Damages depend
on both the price the cartel set and on ct because the latter determines the competitive
benchmark. We will specify the formula consistent with U.S. antitrust practice:
x
¡
P t, ct
¢
=
³
P t − bP ¡ct¢´ ¡a− bP t¢ .
bP (ct) is referred to as the "but for" price and P t − bP (ct) as the "overcharge." It is
worth mentioning that government penalties have, in recent years, been sensitive to cartel
behavior and are no longer trivial compared to damages. While the exact formula used
to calculate government fines is unclear - formally, there is a formula but the "fudge"
12
factor is big enough to leave the true formula unclear- it appears to be related to the same
types of variables as used in x (P t, ct) though may give weight to the revenue involved,
independent of the overcharge.7
In specifying the cartel’s problem, incentive compatibility constraints ensuring the
self-enforcing nature of the collusive arrangement are ignored. It seems natural to first
characterize the unconstrained joint profit-maximizing case which is challenging enough
in itself. When the cartel goes to choose price in period t, the state variables are¡
P t−1,Xt−1, ct,mt−11 , L
t−1¢ where P t−1 is the lagged (common) price, Xt−1 is accu-
mulated damages, ct is current cost, mt−11 is the first moment of buyers’ beliefs on price
changes, and Lt−1 is the relative likelihood that buyers attach to recent prices. Letting
ηt denote the price change in period t, the equations of motion are
P t = P t−1 + ηt
ct+1 = υ
¡
ct + εt+1
¢
Xt = βXt−1 + γx
¡
P t−1 + ηt, ct
¢
mt1 = λm
t−1
1 + (1− λ) ηt
Lt =
¡
Lt−1
¢ξ
ϕ
¡
ηt,mt−11
¢
,
where
ϕ
¡
ηt,mt−11
¢
≡
"
h
¡
ηt;mt−11 , w
2
1σ
2
ε
¢
h
¡
mt−11 ;m
t−1
1 , w
2
1σ
2
ε
¢# .
The set of price changes is slightly modified,
Φ
¡
P t−1
¢
≡
©
η ∈ Φ : P t−1 + η ∈
£
c, P
¤ª
,
to ensure that price remains in the set
£
c, P
¤
where P ≥ Pm (c) .
7A key implicit assumption is that the cartel anticipates the plaintiffs and/or antitrust authorities
being able to successfully identify the true but for price and successfully arguing in court as to its value.
In practice, this is a major source of contention. For an analysis of how a standard method for estimating
the but for price may be biased, see Harrington (2004b).
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The cartels’ value function is defined recursively:
V
¡
P t−1,Xt−1, ct,mt−11 , L
t−1¢
= max
ηt∈Φ(P t−1)
π
¡
P t−1 + ηt, ct
¢
+ δφ
³¡
Lt−1
¢ξ
ϕ
¡
ηt,mt−11
¢´
×∙Z
W
¡
υ
¡
ct + ε
¢¢
f
¡
ε;µε, σ
2
ε
¢
dε− βXt−1 − γx
¡
P t−1 + ηt, ct
¢
− F
¸
+δ
h
1− φ
³¡
Lt−1
¢ξ
ϕ
¡
ηt,mt−11
¢´i
×Z
V
¡
P t−1 + ηt, βXt−1 + γx
¡
P t−1 + ηt, ct
¢
, υ
¡
ct + ε
¢
, λmt−11 + (1− λ) ηt,¡
Lt−1
¢ξ
ϕ
¡
ηt,mt−11
¢´
f
¡
ε;µε, σ
2
ε
¢
dε.
The cartel earns current profit of π
¡
P t−1 + ηt, ct
¢
by making a price change of ηt and, with
probability φ
³¡
Lt−1
¢ξ
ϕ
¡
ηt,mt−11
¢´
, the cartel is detected. In that event, firms receive
non-collusive profits thereafter and pay penalties. With the complementary probability,
the cartel is not detected in which case the future value is that attached to colluding given
the new values to the state variables.
To summarize, the parameters in the model are:
Parameters
Demand a, b > 0
Cost levels c ∈ [0, a) , c ∈ (c, a)
Cost shocks µε ∈ <, σ2ε > 0
Non-collusive solution w0 ∈ [0, a/2) , w1 ∈ (1/2, 1]
Penalty γ, F ≥ 0, β ∈ (0, 1)
Detection α0 ∈ [0, 1) , α1 ∈ (0, 1− α0] , α2 > 0
Time preferences δ ∈ (0, 1)
Updating ξ, λ ∈ (0, 1)
If a cartel is formed, it occurs in period 1 so that the accumulated damages entering into
period 1 is zero and the inherited price is the non-collusive price. The initial conditions
are then ¡
P 0,X0, c1,m01, L
0
¢
=
¡
w0 + w1c
0, 0, c0 + ε1,m01, L
0
¢
.
Thus, the system is initialized with
¡
c0,m01, L
0
¢
and requires a randomly selected sequence
of cost shocks, {εt}Tt=1 , where T is the length of the simulation.
In concluding, this model is unorthodox in that firms are "smarter" than buyers in that
firms know the process by which buyers detect collusion but buyers do not know how firms
choose prices. While some economists may be uncomfortable with this departure from
14
the prevalent paradigm, it strikes us as eminently plausible if not compelling. Pricing is a
first-order consideration for firms, while detecting collusion is far down the list of things
to do for a buyer, particularly in light of the low empirical frequency of cartels.8
3 Cartel Pricing Patterns
Our analysis proceeds by first considering a benchmark case under a variety of initial
conditions. The benchmark parameter configuration is
a = 100, b = 1, c = 20, c = 40, γ = 1.5, F = 0, β = .75, δ = .75, ξ = .5,
λ = .75, µε = 0, σ
2
ε = 2, α0 = .05, α1 = .45, α2 = 2, w0 = 25, w1 = .75.
The probability of detection is a quadratic in the relative likelihood with a range of
[.05, .5] . As ξ = (z − 1) /z then ξ = .5 is equivalent to buyers using the two most recent
price changes in deciding on whether the price series is "suspicious." The discount factor
is set at the relatively low value of .75 because convergence is very slow for high values
of δ (and also high values of β). (w0, w1) = (25, .75) corresponds to the Nash equilibrium
price for the quantity game when there are three firms. We suspect that the particular
demand parameters and range of cost levels are unimportant for results and thus will not
experiment with them but instead focus precious CPU time on other parameters. Note
that the number of firms is not a parameter in the model. Given symmetry and that
we ignore incentive compatibility constraints, the cartel solution is independent of the
number of firms (though it implicitly matters through the non-collusive solution).
To ascertain robustness, we will also consider the following 12 modifications to the
benchmark case:
σ2ε ∈ {1, 3, 4} , γ ∈ {2.25, 3} , (w0, w1) = (0, 1) , δ = .9,
β = .9, (ξ, λ) ∈ {(.25, .25) , (.75, .9)} , α1 = .2, α2 = 3.
A description of the numerical methods is provided in the Appendix.
3.1 General Analysis
The initial task is to identify how a cartel price path compares to that for a non-collusive
industry. The following procedure is used to produce a collection of price paths for this
purpose.
8But let us state the caveat that buyers may consciously look for collusion if the industry has a history
of past collusion. The model is then relevant to those industries ;acking such a history.
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Step 1 Randomly select initial conditions for cost and buyers’ beliefs. c0 is selected
according to a uniform distribution with support [25, 35] , m01 is selected according
to a uniform distribution with support [−1, 1] , and L is selected according to a
uniform distribution with support [.25, .75] with L0 = L
1
1−ξ .9
Step 2 Randomly select a sequence of 120 cost shocks.
Step 3 Run the non-collusive model for periods 1-40 and then run the collusive model
for periods 41-120 (that is, a cartel is formed in period 41). Continue to run the
non-collusive model for periods 41-120 for purposes of comparison.
Though the conditions at period 1 are random, the initial conditions when the cartel is
formed are generated by non-collusive pricing in the preceding 40 periods. This serves to
provide a more accurate simulation of what a newly formed cartel would face with respect
to what buyers believe are "typical" price changes. In analyzing these price paths, keep
in mind that the non-collusive price path is an affine function of cost, 25 + .75ct, so that
movements in it can be used to track cost (cost movements are then 33% larger than the
reported non-collusive price movements). In that any individual simulation is dependent
on the particular initial conditions and sequence of cost shocks, we’ve conducted more
than 100 simulations and report representative results here.
For the benchmark parameter configuration, Figure 1 presents eight randomly selected
simulated price paths. The first observation is that there are two clearly identifiable phases
to collusion. The initial "transition" phase involves a steady rise in price which appears
largely unrelated to cost shocks (at a minimum, the direction of price is unrelated to
cost shocks). For example, in Figure 1g, the transition phase runs from period 41 to
about period 65. In some instances, this steady rise in price is followed by a fall in
price. For example, in Figure 1a, the transition phase runs until about period 70, with
pricing rising until period 60 and then falling thereafter. We’ll return to this point later.
The ensuing "stationary" phase has price move with cost though, in comparison to the
non-collusive price path, the collusive price is much less sensitive to cost shocks. This
two-phase structure was found to hold for all parameter configurations and we provide
some simulated price paths for σ2ε = 4 (Figure 2), (ξ, λ) = (.25, .25) (Figure 3), and δ = .9
(Figure 4).
9Note that if L0 = L
1
1−ξ then L1 = L if the relative likelihood of the period 1 observation is L. We
specify L0 = L
1
1−ξ so that the intial conditions are not changed as ξ is changed.
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Result #1 The cartel price path has a transition phase - in which price moves largely
independent of cost - and a stationary phase - in which price is responsive to cost.
The transition phase involves a steady rise in price though may conclude with a
modest decline in price.
Let us explain these findings. When formed in period 41, the cartel inherits the non-
collusive price of 25 + .75c40. Ideally, it would like price to be much higher, generally in
the vicinity of the simple monopoly price of 50 + .5c40.10 However, if it were to rapidly
raise price, it would very likely create suspicions among buyers since, in light of preceding
price changes, price rises of that magnitude are perceived as being highly unlikely. Hence,
the cartel gradually raises price so that the series of price changes is not too unlikely in
light of buyers’ beliefs. Of course, buyers’ beliefs are adapting so as price rises they come
to expect more price increases (a point to which we’ll return later). At the same time,
cost is changing which alters the target price for the cartel. However, unless there are
some large negative cost shocks, the target will generally remain above the cartel’s price
for some length of time; this implies a steadily rising price as part of the transition phase.
For example, consider the path in Figure 1-d and recall that cost wanders in the interval
[20, 40] and that a non-collusive price of 40 corresponds to a cost of 20 and that a cost
of 20 means a simple monopoly price of 60. Even though cost falls after the formation of
the cartel, price steadily rises until it hits around 60 at which point the cartel shifts into
the stationary phase.
During the stationary phase, the cartel is adjusting price to cost for the usual reasons
but, in doing so, it wants price movements to be consistent with buyers’ beliefs so as to
avoiding triggering detection of collusion. This has a number of implications that we’ll
develop over the course of our discussion and briefly summarize here. If buyers have come
to expect price increases then the cartel may need to raise price even if cost is unchanged
or falls slightly. Similarly, the cartel cannot respond commensurately to large cost shocks
which means that extreme cost changes may not be passed through as with a non-collusive
industry. This suggests that price variability may be less under collusion and that cost
shocks may take a longer time to pass through. The responsiveness of the cartel price to
cost is most easily seen for large trends in cost. In Figure 1-b, cost rises over periods 60-85
and price rises with it though the hills and valleys are milder. In Figure 1-d, cost rises
sharply over periods 110-120 and, though the response is lagged and more gradual, price
10 It may want a price below the simple monopoly price in order to reduce the amount of expected
damages.
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eventually rises sharply as well. In Figure 1-e, cost rises then falls over periods 95-120
and the cartel price follows that movement in a lagged manner. It is clear from Figures
1-4 that the cartel price path is much less sensitive to cost than the non-collusive price
path and we’ll provide some more systematic evidence shortly.
The speed with which price rises during the transition phase is closely linked to the
parameters influencing buyers’ beliefs. Comparing the price paths for σ2ε ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} , the
transitional phase is shorter and price rises faster when the cost variance is higher. The
results for σ2ε = 2 (Figure 1) and σ
2
ε = 4 (Figure 2) are reported here. Recall that buyers’
beliefs over price changes are based on the non-collusive price variance, w21σ
2
ε. As cost
variability rises so does the variability of buyers’ beliefs over price changes. This means
that a series of price increases, when the expected price change is positive but small or
negative, is perceived as being more likely because price is perceived as more volatile. As
the probability of detection is then less sensitive to the price path, the cartel can raise
price quicker without being as concerned about detection. In other words, there is less
of a need to manipulate buyers’ beliefs - as buyers implicitly have a stricter criterion to
consider something anomalous - though it is still important to restrain price changes and
have price increase gradually.
ξ and λ are the updating parameters for buyers’ beliefs and should be influential in
transitional pricing. A buyer’s current expectation on price changes is a weighted average
of the previous period’s expectation, which is given weight λ, and the current price change.
As λ is reduced, the expectation then becomes more sensitive to recent price changes. This
means, for example, that if firms pursue a series of price increases when buyers initially
expected no price changes, buyers’ beliefs will respond quick to these price increases and
thus buyers are less likely to find them anomalous. As ξ is reduced, the relative likelihood
of the price series puts more weight on the most recent price changes; in essence, the test
of the likelihood of recent price changes uses a shorter price series. Therefore, similar to a
lower value for λ, the likelihood of triggering detection is less sensitive to price changes in
the distant past. Moving from (ξ, λ) equal to (.5, .75) (Figure 1) to (.25, .25) (Figure 3),
buyers’ beliefs respond quicker and, as shown by the simulated price paths, the length of
the transition phase shortens and price rises more rapidly. This property is confirmed for
unreported results for (ξ, λ) = (.75, .9) . Buyers’ beliefs adjust quicker to the price rises
which not only means price rises are less likely to trigger detection but they induce the
cartel to lay the groundwork for future price increases by raising price more in the current
period. This highlights how the cartel price path is driven not only by the desire to have
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price movements appear reasonable to buyers but also how the cartel can manipulate
what is perceived to be reasonable.
Result #2 The transitional phase is shorter and the transitional price path rises faster
when: i) the variance of cost shocks is greater; and ii) buyers’ beliefs are more
sensitive to recent price changes.
To more systematically explore price variability during the stationary phase, we ran
the following procedure. The first two steps are the same as before except that, in step 2,
we generate a sequence of 200 cost shocks. The third step serves to produce a collection
of stationary price paths.
Step 3’ Run the non-collusive model and the collusive model for periods 1-200. Using
data from periods 101-200, calculate the variance of price.
For each of the 13 parameter configurations, this simulation is performed ten times.
Table 1 reports the price variance (averaged across those ten runs) along with the range
of the price variance, under both collusion and non-collusion.11 As the results show,
the cartel price path is much less variable than the non-collusive price path. For the
benchmark case, for example, the variance of the non-collusive price path has a minimum
value of .7945 (over the ten runs), while the variance of the collusive price path has a
maximum value of .0994. This reflects the desire of the cartel to keep suspicious price
movements to a minimum. Also note that the theoretical price variance for a monopolist
is on the order of (1/2)2 σ2ε so that the cartel price variance is much lower than that as
well. That the the price variance is lower under collusion is consistent with the empirical
finding of Abrantes-Metz, Froeb, Geweke, and Taylor (2005).12
Not surprisingly, as the cost variance rises, the cartel price variance rises with it;
see Table 2. More interesting is that price variability rises faster than cost variability
as reflected in the ratio of the price variance to σ2ε falling with respect to σ
2
ε. As the
cost variance rises, so does the variance of the non-collusive price. Hence, buyers’ beliefs
become more diffuse which makes it harder to trigger suspicions. As a result, the cartel
can make price more responsive to cost without as much risk of collusion being detected.
To explore the issue about cost pass-through, we used 100 periods of data from the
stationary phase and regressed the change in price on the contemporaneous change in cost
11 If cost had an unbounded support then the theoretical non-collusive price variance would be w21σ
2
ε =
.5625σ2ε.
12Mixed results regarding collusion reducing the variance of price is provided in Bolotova, Connor, and
Miller (2005).
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and the four most recent lagged cost shocks. This exercise was performed for a randomly
selected price and cost series for each of the 13 parameter configurations. Note that only
the contemporaneous cost shock matters for the non-collusive and monopoly price series.
As shown in Table 3, lagged cost changes are economically and statistically significant in
explaining price fluctuations when firms collude. The cartel is then gradually passing cost
changes to price in order to avoid anomalous price changes that arouse suspicions.
Result #3 Compared to the non-collusive price and the simple monopoly price, the
variability of the cartel price is much less and cost shocks are passed through more
gradually. The variance of the cartel price increases faster than the variance in cost.
In concluding this section, it is worth discussing here an assumption on the evolution
of buyers’ beliefs on price changes. Upon formation of the cartel, buyers’ beliefs are based
on the non-collusive price path. For that reason, we assumed that the variance of buyers’
beliefs on price changes is w1σ2ε. But we also assumed that this variance remained fixed
over the life of cartel. The reason was a pragmatic one - adding the variance of price
changes as a sixth state variable would impose a severe computational burden that might
prevent us from solving for the value function. To what extent does this assumption of
a fixed variance to buyers’ beliefs bias our results? During the transitional phase, this
assumption is probably fine because the issue is whether buyers will consider the cartel
price path unlikely based on their beliefs prior to cartel formation. More problematic is
during the stationary phase when the variance on price changes would adjust if given a
chance. We conjecture that our results would be robust to that modification. Since our
analysis showed the cartel price path is less variable than the non-collusive price path,
buyers would reduce the estimated variance on price changes below w1σ2ε which would
cause the cartel to smooth out price changes even more. Hence, the stationary cartel
price path would still be much less volatile than the non-collusive or simple monopoly
price paths.
3.2 Deterministic Cost Case
A challenge in identifying properties of the collusive price path is that any individual series
depends on the realization of the cost shocks which makes it difficult to discern how firms
are "trying" to change prices. In other words, any price path is a confluence of the cartel’s
target path and the change in the target path due to the change in cost. To isolate the
intended trajectory for price, we use the policy function solved for the stochastic model
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and simulate it when cost is unchanging: ct = c0 ∀t. The initial conditions are:¡
c0,m01, L
¢
=
³
30, 0, .75
1
1−ξ
´
.
At a cost of 30, the simple monopoly price is 65. Note that the cartel price path is now
deterministic (subject to the caveat of being detected but we report the price path in the
event that it is not detected).
For the benchmark parameter configuration, Figure 5 reports the time series on price,
change in price, average price change as perceived by buyers (that is, first moment),
probability of detection, value of the cartel, and accumulated damages. The value of
forming a cartel starts around 3950 which exceeds the non-collusive value of 3680. The
long-run value of the cartel is about 4370 though moves non-monotonically. This is due
to a variety of forces at work. When the cartel begins, it has no damages which serves to
raise the value of collusion. However, it also inherits the non-collusive price and bigger
price increases bring with them a larger chance of detection. As time moves on, damages
accumulate (though they also can move non-monotonically) which lowers the collusive
value but this is typically more than compensated by inheriting a higher price, which not
only means higher profit but it makes it easier to achieve yet higher prices. The latter
results in a falling probability of detection; the probability of detection is initially around
13% and then declines to its steady-state level of 5%.
Turning to the price path, detection considerations are a severe constraining influence
on price, as suggested by the stochastic price paths. Though the steady-state price is just
a little below the simple monopoly price of 65, it takes many periods to get to that level.
The striking property, however, is that price overshoots its long-run price. After several
periods above the long-run price, the cartel lowers price and eventually settles down.13
Returning to Figure 1, overshooting - that is, price rises then falls during the transition
phase - occurs in cases a, c, d, e, and h. We now know this is not a feature of movements
in cost but is rather the intended trajectory for price. This overshooting phenomenon is
present in some but not all of the cases we’ve examined. Figure 6 shows the price paths
for σ2ε ∈ {1, 3} , Figure 7 for (ξ, λ) ∈ {(.25, .25) , (.75, .9)} , and Figure 8 for δ = .9 and
(w0, w1) = (0, 1) (which is when the non-collusive solution is the competitive solution).
The overshooting is observed in several of these cases and, in some, even entails price
temporarily exceeding the simple monopoly price of 65; see σ2ε = 1, (ξ, λ) = (.75, .9), and
(w0, w1) = (0, 1) .
13Though there is a steady-state cycle, we believe this is an artifact of the discreteness of the price
space and is of little importance.
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What underlies these dynamics is that the cartel is trying to systematically raise price
in such a manner that the buyers don’t perceive the price series as anomalous. Of course,
what buyers consider anomalous is itself endogenous and depends on how firms have
priced in the past. What this means is that the cartel wants to raise price sufficiently
gradually so as to get buyers accustomed to its price changes. But there is a problem.
When the cartel price reaches its long-run steady-state level, the buyers have largely seen
price increases and have come to expect such (that is, mt1 > 0). Notice in Figure 8 that
the steady-state price is 65 and is first reached around period 20, at which point the
expected price increase is about 1.25. As buyers expect price to rise by 1.25 each period,
a series of zero price changes is apt to be perceived as anomalous. The cartel instead
gradually lowers the rate of price increases so as to make detection less likely. As price
may not come down fast enough, the cartel may eventually have to engage in some price
decreases. As shown, the cartel continues to raise price up to about 68 at which point
price is brought back down and then converges to 65.
Consistent with this explanation, overshooting is noticeably more when the variance
of cost shocks is less (compare σ2ε = 1 with σ
2
ε = 3), buyers’ beliefs are more sluggish
(compare (ξ, λ) = (.75, .9) with (ξ, λ) = (.25, .25)), and the cartel weighs the future less
(compare the benchmark case of δ = .75 with δ = .9). If cost shocks are less variable than
buyers are more likely to become suspicious since their beliefs are less diffuse. There is
then more of a need to manipulate prices in order to manipulate beliefs. If buyers beliefs
are more sluggish then they respond slower which means more manipulation is required.
In considering the role of the discount factor, first note that a cartel faces an intertemporal
trade-off as raising price faster means higher current profit but a lower future payoff due to
greater damages and a higher probability of detection. A more patient cartel then tends
to raise price more gradually so they bring the price path in for a "softer landing." It is
when price rises faster that buyers come to expect bigger price increases and overshooting
is more significant.
Result #4 The cartel price path exhibits more overshooting when: i) the cost variance
is greater; ii) buyers’ beliefs respond slower; and iii) firms value the future more.
Do we think that overshooting is a real phenomenon? The available empirical evidence
on cartel pricing doesn’t really speak to the issue in that no one has looked for it and it
is a subtle property. Though it is a natural implication of strategic cartel pricing when
buyers’ beliefs are empirically based, its empirical relevance is unclear. In any case, this
overshooting pattern is not ubiquitous and occurs only for some parameter configurations.
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If the data doesn’t reveal such a pattern, it may just be telling us that the parameter
values are more consistent with, say, δ = .9 than with δ = .75.
4 Concluding Remarks
The analysis of this paper is very much exploratory in intent. It is an initial attempt
to model cartel pricing while specifying a plausible belief structure regarding detection.
On the plus side, it is able to produce cartel price paths which are starting to look
like real cartel price paths. The analysis produced a number of systematic properties of
which the most significant are that the cartel price path is comprised of a transition and
stationary phase and that, in the stationary phase, collusion reduces the price variance
and results in price changes being more responsive to lagged cost changes. These may
prove valuable in the development of testable hypotheses that to identify the presence
of a cartel. On the negative side, this approach has had to make a number of strong
assumptions about the buyer belief formation process. Just as buyers having equilibrium
beliefs is too sophisticated for this context, our approach may be too naive in that buyers
are purely empirical and don’t use any understanding about collusion. Pluses and minuses
aside, the primary intent of this research is to begin the process of developing better models
of price-fixing cartels. There is rich institutional information on cartels that we can use
in our modelling and a growing set of empirical properties that we can try to explain.
We hope that this paper will encourage others to develop models that can capture the
richness observed in cartel behavior.
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5 Appendix: Numerical Methods
The process that we used to come up with a numerical version ofW (c) is a straightforward
application of the value function iteration method. First, discretize the state space, [c, c],
for c and denote it C. Second, use a m-node Gaussian quadrature to approximate the
density function for the cost shock f(ε;µε, σ
2
ε). Third, use the following algorithm to
derive W (c):
Step I [Initialization]: Set W (0)(c) = 0, ∀ c ∈ C. For all c ∈ C, compute the non-
collusive price bP (c) and the associated current period profit [ bP (c)− c]D( bP (c)).
Step II [Interpolation]: Given W (k)(c), for all c ∈ C, compute:
Eε[W (υ(c+ ε))] ≡
Z
W (υ(c+ ε))f(ε;µε, σ
2
ε)dε
∼=
mX
i=1
Pr .(εi)W
(k)(υ(c+ εi)),
and derive W (k+1)(c) = [ bP (c)− c]D( bP (c)) +Eε[W (υ(c+ ε))].
Step III [Convergence check]: Compute the infinite norm for W (k+1)(c) −W (k)(c).
Stop and set W (c) =W (k)(c), if the value ' 0; otherwise, go back to Step II.14
With knowledge on W (·), V (·) is solved using the collocation method. Different from
value function iteration, it starts with an initial approximation of the unknown function
V (·) which is a linear combination of some known basis functions. By Miranda and Fackler
(2002), a k−degree approximation for V (·), where k ≡ kP × kX × kc × km1 × kL, can be
represented as:
V (P,X, c,m1, L) ∼=
kPX
iP=1
kXX
iX=1
kxX
ix=1
km1X
im1=1
kLX
iL=1
eiP iXicim1 iLϕiP iXicim1 iL(P,X, c,m1, L)
= [ΓL(L)⊗ Γm1(m1)⊗ Γc(c)⊗ ΓX(X)⊗ ΓP (P )]e,
where ki is the degree of approximation for dimension i ∈ {P,X, c,m1, L}, Γi(i) is a
1 × ki vector of basis functions over dimension i, and e is a k × 1 vector with properly
stacked coefficients. One can start with a initial guess of e and fix it by requiring the
approximant to satisfy the Bellman equation at the k nodes. The Chebychev polynomial
with the associated Chebychev nodes is used for the basis functions.15
14As, in general, υ(c+ εi) /∈ C, evaluation of W (k)(υ(c+ εi)) at step II uses first-degree interpolation
(table lookup).
15 See Judd (1999) and Miranda and Fackler (2002) for the pros and cons of different interpolation
methods.
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The state space is defined and the Γi(·) functions and ki nodes are chosen for each
state variable. Given the nodes, the choice set (action space) is constructed for each
state.16 For each state and action, compute h(·) and h(·)/maxh(·).17 The new state
is then derived according to the equations of motion.18 Compute the following: current
period profit, π(P 0, c), the probability of detection, φ (L0), and the expected non-collusive
payoff Eε[W (c0)]. Finally, we use the following algorithm to derive the numerical version
of V (·):
Step I [Initialization]: Initialize e(0) and, thereby, V (0)(·).
Step II [Interpolation]: Given V (k)(·), evaluate the expected collusive payoffEε[V (k)(·)]
at the resulting new state for each state and action.
Step III [Maximization]: Maximize π(·)+δφ (·) (Eε[W (·)]−X 0 − F )+δ(1−φ (·))Eε[V (k)(·)]
and set the maximized value as V (k+1).
Step IV [Updating]: With V (k) and V (k+1), solve for e, and update e(k) to e(k+1).
Step V [Convergence check]: Compute the infinite norm for e(k+1) − e(k). Stop and
set V (·) = V (k+1)(·), if this value ' 0; otherwise, go back to Step II.
Given the collusive value function, the simulated price paths were created by maximiz-
ing the value function for each realization of the state, given a sequence of cost shocks.19
Given the initial values for these state variables,
P 0 = w0 + w1c,X
0 = 0, c1 = c,m01, L
0 = L1/(1−ξ),
this leaves three variables, (c,m01, L), unspecified. To avoid interpolation beyond the
specified state space, the smallest Chebchev node for the damage state variable is used.
Given (P 0, X0, c1, m01, L
0), construct the choice set: η ∈ Φ(P 0).20 For each η ∈
Φ(P 0), compute h(η) and h(η)/maxh(η), derive the new states (P (η), X(η),m1(η), L(η))
according to the equations of motion, and calculate the current period profit π(P (η), c1),
16 In general, the action space for price changes with P ∈ [P, P ] is Φ(P ) ≡ [P − P, P − P ] and we use
the following discretized subset, {η ∈ Φ(P ): P + η ∈ [P +m1, P +m1] ∩ [0, P ]}.
17To calculate h(·), the normal probability density function is used instead of the Gaussian quadrature
approximant.
18Throughout the numerical process, only two states are evaluated: the initial state as decided by the
approximation method and the new state given by the equations of motion.
19We found this gave more stable results than approximating the policy function and using it for
generating the price path.
20Again, we consider a discretized subset of Φ(P 0) : {η ∈ Φ(P 0): P 0+η ∈ [P 0+m1, P 0+m1]∩ [0, P ]}.
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the probability of detection φ (L(η)), the expected non-collusive payoff Eε[W (c1+ε)], and
the expected collusive payoff Eε[V (P 1, X1, c1+ ε, m11, L
1)].21 The rest of the calculation
involves solving the maximization problem and thereby deriving η1:
η1 ≡ argmax
η∈Φ(P 0)
π(P (η), c1) + δφ (L(η))
¡
Eε[W (c
1 + ε)]−X(η)− F
¢
+δ(1− φ (L(η)))Eε[V (P (η),X(η), c1 + ε,m1(η), L(η))].
After deriving η1, set P 1 = P 0+η1, and update (X0,m01, L
0) to (X1,m11, L
1) according
to the equations of motion, while randomly selecting ε1 and setting c2 = c1 + ε1 (for the
stochastic cost case) and setting c2 = c1 (for the determistic cost case). With (P 1,
X1, c2,m11, L
1), the process is repeated for at least 140 periods.
The results in this paper are based on the number of nodes as listed under Case I
in the table below with the node placement determined by the Chebychev method. To
test the robustness of this approximation, the value function was re-calculated for the
following additional cases which vary in the number of nodes.
Number of Nodes
State variable/Case I II III IV V VI VII VIII
P t−1 ∈ [20, 80] 6 7 7 8 7 7 8 8
Xt−1 ∈ [0, 5000] 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 5
ct ∈ [20, 40] 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 4
mt−11 ∈ [−2.5, 2.5] 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Lt−1 ∈ [0, 1] 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Total # of states 3,750 3,500 3,500 3,200 2,800 4,375 4,000 4,000
We generally gave more nodes to the price state variable because that is the one most likely
to be non-monotonic and, hence, more nodes might make a greater difference. Though
some properties of the value function do change, the price paths are very robust with the
exception of a few cases when m01 = −1. The range of Xt−1 is changed to [0, 10000] when
γ = 3, β = .9, and (w0, w1) = (0, 1) .
For the computation, all the value function iterations were done on a Dell PrecisionTM
Workstation 340 with 2.0 GHz Intel
R°
XeonTM CPU. For the path simulations, we used a
Dell OptiPlexTM SX270T with 3.0 GHz Intel
R°
Patinum
R°
4 CPU. The computing time
for the value function in the benchmark case was about 3.18 hours, while each price path
simulation (for 200 periods) took about 11 minutes.
21Note that the cost shock is in the path simulations. We use the expected value operator, Eε[·] , for
notational consistence.
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Figure 5. Benchmark: Deterministic Cost 
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Parameters
Min Max Average Min Max Average
Benchmark 0.0616 0.0994 0.078 0.7945 1.1958 0.9667
σε
2 = 1 0.0225 0.0374 0.0289 0.3338 0.6685 0.4854
σε
2 = 3 0.1265 0.1668 0.1441 1.3022 1.8679 1.5755
σε
2 = 4 0.2199 0.2828 0.2546 1.1591 3.4468 1.9802
γ = 3 0.0633 0.0853 0.0753 0.7264 1.3753 1.0152
γ = 2.25 0.0597 0.1035 0.0774 0.6175 1.2552 0.955
(ξ , λ) = (0.25, 0.25) 0.0517 0.0898 0.0633 0.7073 1.2636 0.9404
(ξ , λ) = (0.75, 0.9) 0.0246 0.0366 0.0314 0.7473 1.367 1.053
(ω0 , ω1) = (0, 1) 0.1857 0.2195 0.2066 1.4383 2.2561 1.818
(α0 , α1 , α1) = (0.05, 0.2, 2) 0.0659 0.1102 0.0826 0.7537 1.2683 1.0087
(α0 , α1 , α1) = (0.05, 0.45, 3) 0.098 0.1208 0.1091 0.6048 1.1991 0.9343
β  = 0.9 0.0623 0.1418 0.0862 0.8099 1.3123 1.0152
δ  = 0.9 0.0591 0.0794 0.0702 0.8814 1.1546 1.0007
σε
2
1
2
3
4
Collusion Non Collusion
Table 1: Variance of Price
Table 2
Collusive Price Variance Ratio of σε
2 to collusive price variance
0.029 34
0.255 16
0.078 26
0.144 21
est. t-stat. est. t-stat. est. t-stat. est. t-stat.
Benchmark 0.14 (9.17) 0.09 (6.04) 0.03 (2.23) 0.05 (3.17) 0.5355
0.07 (5.09) 0.07 (5.06) 0.07 (4.91) 0.05 (3.87) 0.5169
0.12 (7.18) 0.08 (4.63) 0.04 (2.62) 0.07 (4.23) 0.5481
0.17 (9.41) 0.11 (6.26) 0.02 (1.10) 0.05 (2.45) 0.5826
0.13 (8.53) 0.09 (5.81) 0.06 (4.06) 0.04 (2.44) 0.5243
0.12 (8.14) 0.05 (3.24) 0.06 (3.81) 0.02 (1.25) 0.4277
0.10 (6.42) 0.08 (5.41) 0.07 (4.22) 0.06 (3.88) 0.4935
0.06 (4.86) 0.05 (4.10) 0.04 (2.96) 0.03 (2.75) 0.3699
0.19 (7.39) 0.05 (2.05) 0.04 (1.62) 0.06 (2.46) 0.4355
0.14 (10.79) 0.10 (7.70) 0.06 (4.21) 0.05 (3.48) 0.6585
0.18 (9.64) 0.06 (3.23) 0.05 (2.83) 0.01 (0.39) 0.5011
0.09 (5.88) 0.08 (5.73) 0.07 (4.97) 0.06 (3.74) 0.5021
0.10 (6.31) 0.03 (1.53) 0.03 (1.70) 0.05 (3.03) 0.4101
R-bar 
squared
Table 3. OLS Regression Results: Price Differences on Cost Differences 
diff_cost diff_lag_1_cost diff_lag_2_cost diff_lag_3_cost
12 =εσ
32 =εσ
42 =εσ
3=γ
25.2=γ
)25,.25(.),( =λξ
)9,.75(.),( =λξ
9.=β
9.=δ
)1,0(),( 10 =ww
2.1 =α
32 =α
